He explains his rejection of
"popular-scientific" lectures, which he believes offer a superficial
understanding and merely gratify a modern curiosity for the latest discoveries.
Instead, he intends to discuss Ethics, defining it through a wide range of
synonyms—such as the "enquiry into what is valuable" or the
"meaning of life"—to help the audience see the collective
"typical features" of the subject. He warns that philosophical lectures
are often difficult to follow because the listener may struggle to see both the
path and the ultimate goal of the argument simultaneously.
The author distinguishes
between two uses of language: the trivial or relative sense and the ethical or
absolute sense. In the relative sense, words like "good" or
"important" simply mean meeting a predetermined standard or serving a
specific purpose, such as a "good chair" or the "right
road" to a destination. However, an absolute judgement of value carries a
distinct weight; for instance, while one can choose not to play tennis well,
one "ought to want to behave better" in an ethical context,
regardless of personal inclination.
Wittgenstein contends that no
statement of fact can ever imply an absolute judgement of value. He illustrates
this by imagining an omniscient person writing a book containing every possible
fact and state of mind in the world; such a book would contain no ethical
propositions, as all facts and propositions exist on the same level. Even a
detailed description of a murder remains a mere statement of facts, as the
"ethical" element cannot be captured by scientific or factual
description.
He argues that a scientific
book on ethics is impossible because language is a vessel only capable of
conveying natural meaning and sense. Ethics is supernatural, and trying to fit
absolute value into factual language is like trying to pour a gallon of water
into a teacup. He asserts that an "absolutely right road"—one that
everyone would logically feel compelled to follow—is a chimera, as no state of affairs
possesses the coercive power of an absolute judge.
To clarify his meaning,
Wittgenstein shares a personal "experience par excellence": wondering
at the existence of the world. He also describes the feeling of being
"absolutely safe," where nothing can injure him regardless of what
happens. He points out that expressing these feelings in words is linguistic
nonsense, because "wonder" typically implies imagining an alternative
(like wondering at a large dog because small dogs exist), yet one cannot
imagine the world not existing.
The lecture notes that ethical
and religious expressions often function as similes or allegories, such as
describing God as a powerful human whose grace we seek. However, Wittgenstein
argues that these are "nonsensical" because if one drops the simile
to describe the facts behind it, no facts are found. This leads to the paradox
that a factual experience can appear to have "supernatural" or
absolute value.
Using the example of a
"miracle," like a person growing a lion's head, he explains that a scientific
view of a fact precludes it from being seen as a miracle. Once an event is
investigated and categorised, its miraculous nature disappears. He concludes
that the attempt to use language to express the absolute is not a failure of
logical analysis, but rather that nonsensicality is the very essence of such
expressions.
Ultimately, Wittgenstein
describes the human attempt to speak of Ethics or Religion as a tendency to
"run against the boundaries of language". This "running against
the walls of our cage" is hopeless and adds nothing to scientific
knowledge. Nevertheless, he concludes by stating that he deeply respects this
human tendency and would never ridicule it.
